TL;DR
- Certifiable, published in 2022, and already held by many organisations, which makes it the cheapest available anchor for NHI evidence.
- Seventeen Annex A controls, in the thirteen rows of the table below, carry the weight, clustered in identity and access management (A.5.15 to A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.3 and A.8.5), cryptography (A.8.24) and supplier relationships (A.5.19 to A.5.23).
- Every control terminates in an artefact. A control that produces no export cannot be tested and will be treated as absent.
- The Statement of Applicability is where NHI scope is silently lost, because controls are justified against a human-shaped reading.
- The recurring finding is not missing controls. It is access reviews that cover humans and silently exclude machine accounts.
Why 27001 is the cheapest anchor available
Many organisations pursuing non-human identity governance already hold ISO/IEC 27001, or are within reach of it. That matters more than the standard's technical fit: the management system machinery (scope, risk methodology, documented information control, internal audit, management review, corrective action) is already operating, and extending it to a new asset class is far cheaper than establishing it.
It is also the anchor a procurement team recognises. "We govern non-human identities" is unverifiable. "Our ISO/IEC 27001 scope includes machine credentials, and here is the relevant SoA extract" is checkable. See ISO/IEC 42001 for the AI-specific counterpart, and the framework comparison for how they relate.
Control-by-control mapping
This is our practical reading, not text from the standard. ISO/IEC 27001 does not name non-human identities. Control numbers and titles follow ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A. The second column is our own short summary; the standard is copyrighted and we do not reproduce control text. The test and evidence columns describe where an auditor's questions tend to land when machine credentials are in scope.
| Annex A control | In short | What the auditor tests for NHI | Evidence that answers it |
|---|---|---|---|
| A.5.9 Inventory of information and other associated assets | Know what you have and who owns it. | Whether non-human identities appear in the asset inventory at all, and whether each has an owner. | The non-human identity inventory as a dated export with owner, purpose and system reached. This is where an NHI programme formally lands. |
| A.5.15 Access control | A policy that governs access. | Whether the access control policy addresses non-human access explicitly, or only describes users in a way that implies people. | The policy, with a section that names service accounts, workload identities and automated access, sets credential lifetime by risk tier and describes exception handling. |
| A.5.16 Identity management | The whole life cycle of an identity. | The central control for NHI. Whether identities are created through a defined process, attributed to an accountable party and removed when no longer required, for every identity and not only human ones. | A complete inventory with a named owner per identity, the creation process with its approval record, and removal records for identities retired in the period. Any identity without an owner needs an entry in an exception register. |
| A.5.17 Authentication information | How secrets are allocated and managed. | How secrets are issued, stored, distributed and changed. For NHI the sharp question is whether the credential ever existed outside a controlled store. | Issuance and rotation records for a sampled set with timestamps, the age distribution of active credentials against your stated threshold, and exceptions with a dated remediation path. |
| A.5.18 Access rights | Provision, review, change and removal of access. | Periodic review. A common failure is a review whose population excludes non-human accounts. | Review records showing that the population included non-human identities, who reviewed each, the decision taken, and proof the revocations were carried out. |
| A.5.19 to A.5.23 Supplier relationships and cloud services | Risk from third parties. | Whether credentials held by suppliers, and grants given to third-party applications, are known and reviewed. | A register of credentials held by suppliers and of third-party OAuth grants into your estate, with scope and review date. |
| A.8.2 Privileged access rights | Restrict and manage privilege. | Whether privileged non-human identities are identified as privileged at all. Where privilege is classified by account type and not by permission held, an administrative service account can fall outside the privileged population. | The definition of privileged in use, the resulting privileged NHI population with a justification and approval for each, monitoring evidence, and separate, more frequent review records for that population. |
| A.8.3 Information access restriction | Least privilege in practice. | Whether what a machine identity can reach matches what it needs. | Permissions granted compared with permissions exercised over the period. The difference is the finding. |
| A.8.5 Secure authentication | Strength of the authentication mechanism. | The mechanism itself: which machine accounts authenticate with a single static secret, on a deprecated protocol, or from a network location that is too broad. | A register of authentication mechanisms per identity class, with an exception log and remediation dates for anything on a deprecated mechanism. |
| A.8.9 Configuration management | Configuration is controlled. | Whether credentials are kept out of configuration files and images, and whether trust policies and federation conditions are treated as configuration. An over-broad OIDC subject condition is a configuration failure with identity consequences. | Secret scanning results for repositories and images, and policy-as-code check results retained from the pipeline showing trust conditions were validated at deploy time. |
| A.8.15 Logging | Record what happened. | Whether non-human authentication and authorisation events are logged with enough detail to attribute an action to a specific identity. | Log samples demonstrating attribution, retention settings covering the audit period, and evidence that logs cannot be altered by the identities they record. |
| A.8.16 Monitoring activities | Detect anomalous behaviour and act on it. | Whether detection exists for non-human identity anomalies specifically, including interactive human use of a service account. | Detection rules with their logic, alert volumes for the period, and a sample of triaged alerts showing the action taken. |
| A.8.24 Use of cryptography | Key management. | Whether keys and certificates used by machines are inventoried and managed through their life. | A certificate and key inventory with algorithm, key size and expiry. See post-quantum migration. |
Where scope is silently lost: the Statement of Applicability
The SoA records which Annex A controls apply and how they are implemented. It is written once, reviewed lightly thereafter, and it is where non-human identity most often falls out of scope without anyone deciding it should.
The mechanism is mundane. A.5.18 is justified with a description of the quarterly user access review. That description is accurate, the control is implemented, and it covers only human accounts, because that is what the reviewing process was built for. Nothing in the SoA is false, and machine identities are outside the certified control without a single incorrect statement being made.
The SoA test
Read your Statement of Applicability and, for each access-related control, ask: does the implementation description, as written, cover service accounts, API keys, OAuth grants and workload credentials? If it describes a process built around people, the answer is no, and you have found the gap before your auditor does. Correcting the SoA wording is cheap; being told at surveillance is not.
Four findings that recur
- Access reviews exclude non-human accounts. Common, and usually a configuration decision nobody made rather than a policy gap. See auditing NHI.
- Asset inventory omits credentials. A.5.9 is satisfied with a hardware and software inventory, and the credentials that access those assets are nowhere.
- Rotation is asserted, not evidenced. "Secrets are rotated automatically" is a statement. Rotation logs for a sampled set with timestamps are evidence, and the distinction is the entire finding.
- Third-party grants are invisible. A.5.19 to A.5.23 are evidenced with supplier contracts and due-diligence records, while the OAuth grants those suppliers hold into your SaaS estate appear in no register.
What to have ready
Five artefacts cover most of what will be requested:
- A dated inventory export of non-human identities with owner, purpose, credential type and expiry.
- Access review records for the certification period showing non-human accounts in the population, with executed revocations.
- Rotation evidence for a sampled set: actual events, actual timestamps.
- A third-party grant register with scope and review dates.
- An exception register with named approver and expiry for every identity that cannot meet policy.
If a control in your SoA does not terminate in one of these or something like it, it will not survive testing regardless of how well it is described.
Why NHI is in scope even though Annex A never says so
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 predates the current vocabulary. Its access control clauses speak about identities, users and access rights without narrowing the subject to natural persons. Control 5.16 is titled identity management and concerns the life cycle of identities, a formulation that reads as deliberately technology- and subject-neutral.
In practice, three things decide whether your auditor samples machine identities:
- Your own scope statement. If your ISMS scope covers systems that authenticate non-human principals, which is all of them, those principals are in scope by your own definition.
- Your access control policy. If it defines “user” in a way that includes service accounts, you have made them testable. If it is silent, the auditor decides.
- The auditor's own reading. In our view, do not assume an auditor will read these controls as limited to human users.
The trap in staying silent
Some organisations avoid naming non-human identities in the access control policy on the theory that what is not defined cannot be tested. This inverts. An undefined population is an unbounded one, and an auditor who finds service accounts outside every stated control is not obliged to treat them as out of scope. Defining them and stating a differentiated control set is the stronger position.
Crosswalk to other frameworks
If you are evidencing more than one framework, the table below is our mapping, not an official one. NIST publishes an official OLIR crosswalk between SP 800-53 Rev. 5 and ISO/IEC 27001:2022 that is worth using in preference to a hand-built mapping.
Scroll sideways to see all columns.
| Objective | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | OWASP NHI Top 10 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Every NHI has an accountable owner | A.5.16 | AC-2 | NHI1 |
| Privileges limited to task | A.8.2 | AC-6 | NHI5 |
| Credentials managed and rotated | A.5.17 | IA-5 | NHI7, NHI2 |
| Access reviewed periodically | A.5.18 | AC-2(3) | NHI1 |
| Authentication mechanism is sound | A.8.5 | IA-2, IA-5 | NHI4 |
| Activity is logged and attributable | A.8.15 | AU-2, AU-3 | NHI10 |
| Anomalies are detected | A.8.16 | SI-4 | NHI10 |
Frequently asked questions
Does ISO/IEC 27001 cover non-human identities?
Not by name. The standard does not use the term. Seventeen Annex A controls apply in substance in our reading, clustered in identity and access management (A.5.15 to A.5.18 and A.8.2, A.8.3 and A.8.5), cryptography and key management (A.8.24), supplier relationships (A.5.19 to A.5.23), and asset inventory (A.5.9). The mapping is derived rather than stated, which affects how you evidence it but not whether it applies.
Where does non-human identity fall out of ISO 27001 scope?
In the Statement of Applicability. Controls such as A.5.18 on access rights get justified with a description of the quarterly user access review, which is accurate and covers only human accounts because that is what the process was built for. Nothing in the SoA is false and machine identities end up outside the certified control without anyone deciding they should. Read each access-related control's implementation description and ask whether it covers service accounts, API keys and workload credentials as written.
What NHI finding should we expect in an ISO 27001 audit?
Access reviews that cover human accounts and silently exclude non-human ones. The review process was designed for people and never extended, so service accounts, API keys, OAuth grants and workload credentials are never recertified. It is usually a configuration decision nobody made rather than a policy gap, which makes it straightforward to remediate once identified.
What evidence does an auditor want for machine identity controls?
Five artefacts cover most requests: a dated inventory export with owner, purpose, credential type and expiry; access review records for the period showing non-human accounts in the population with executed revocations; rotation evidence for a sampled set with actual timestamps rather than an assertion that rotation happens; a register of third-party OAuth grants and supplier-held credentials with scope and review dates; and an exception register with named approver and expiry.
Should we use ISO 27001 or ISO 42001 for AI agent identity?
Both, for different things. ISO/IEC 27001 is the anchor for non-human identity generally, including the service accounts, secrets and certificates that agents also depend on. ISO/IEC 42001 addresses the AI management system specifically, and is where agent-level evidence such as delegation records and human oversight lands. Organisations with 27001 already hold most of the management system machinery 42001 requires.
Which control covers service accounts?
Primarily 5.16 identity management, with 8.2 where the account is privileged, 5.17 for the credential, and 5.18 for provisioning, review and removal. No single control covers them end to end.
What evidence do auditors want?
Records rather than capability: a complete inventory with named owners, access review evidence whose population included non-human accounts, credential age or rotation records, and removal records tied to decommissioned workloads.
From the publisher
HumanAudit, which publishes this site, is preparing the NHI Governance pack: an NHI policy, ownership register, lifecycle procedures and one control set mapped, as our interpretation, to PCI DSS v4.0.1, ISO/IEC 27001:2022, NIS2 and DORA. Planned for March 2027; not yet on sale, and no price has been published.
Page history
Merged from the nhimanagement.com guide on 7 October 2026, when the two sites were combined: the sections "Why NHI is in scope even though Annex A never says so"; "Crosswalk to other frameworks" and 2 questions in the FAQ. The merged material is under review against our methodology.